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ENDNOTES: A PATT ERN OF R ULING A GA INST M OTHER N ATU RE: WILDLI FE SP EC IES CASES D EC ID ED
KAVANAUGH 0

THE

DC

BY

J USTICE

CIRCUIT

continued fro m p age 10
16

See Migrato ry Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-7 12 [hereinafter MBTA]
(making it unl aw ful to take, kill, or possess migratory birds); see also 50 C.F. R.
§ J 0. 13 (201 6) ( li sting the protected birds under the Mi gratory Bird Treaty Act
and treati es).
17 See Magnu son-S teven s Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1801 - 189 1 (actin g to conserve and manage fi shery resources found
off th e coasts of th e United States).
18 See generally ational Environmemal Po licy Act, 42 U.S.C . §§ 432 1-4370
[here in a fter NEP A] (enri ching th e understanding of th e importance of natural
resources and eco logical systems to citizens).
19 See, e.g., ati o nal Park Organic Act, 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (201 2); Nati onal
Forest M anagement Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1687 (2 01 2); Federal Land Manage ment and Po li cy Act, 4 3 U.S.C. §§ 170 1- 1787(2 01 2); National Wildlife
R efu ge Syste m Act, J 6 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (201 2).
20 See Joseph Toma in, K avanaug h 's Political Leanings Likely Will Be Wrillen
in fo Law, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Aug ust 6, 201 8), https: //www. cin cinnati .com!
story/o pini on/20 18/08/06/o pini on-ka vanaughs-politica l-l eanings- likely-writlen- into- law/862653002/ (stating that environmental cases o ften " pit corporate
inte rests again st the public interest for a clean and hea lth y environment. Here,
Kavanaugh ' s ' hands-off approach to poli cy is jettiso ned. ln hi s opini ons,
Kavanaugh is un a fraid to strain th e interpreta tion of statutes, engage the judic iary in po li cym akin g, and , on occas ion, give mini-lectures on constitutional
law and governm ent. Hi s enviro nmental law opinions, then, directly invo lve
po li cy and po liti cs. In oth er word s, Kavan augh is un a fraid to make, not fo llow,
the law" ).
21 See, e.g. , U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EM E Ho mer C ity Generati on, 572
U.S. 489, 524 (20 14) (ove rturning Justice Kavanaugh 's decisio n 6-2 in a case
where Justice Kavanaugh holds the E PA to an illegall y hi gh standard of revi ew,
w ith hum an li ves and hea lth on th e line); Mex ichem Fluor, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 866 F.3 d 45 1, 453 -54, 464 (D.C. C ir. 20 17) (stating Justice
Kava naugh, over a powerfu l dissent, created a new reading of Section 6 12 of
the C lea n A ir Act that all ows fo reign manu facturers of ozone-depl etin g and
c lim ate change- indu cing hydroflu o rocarbons to avoid regulati on; thi s decision,
too, has been appea led to th e U.S. Supreme Co urt on a writ of certi orari).
22 Accordin g to an Aug ust 20 18 Publi c Citi zen study, Justice Kava naugh
rul ed in favo r of Big Busin ess - defined as th e Chamber of Commerce, Nati ona l
Assoc iation of M anufacturers, and Am eri can Petro leum In stitute - in twentyfive (25) of th e thirty-three (33) cases in thi s category, fo r a seventy-six percent
favorab le bias ra te. Judge Brell Kavanaug h 's Decisions in Cases with Leading
Business A ssociation Involvement, CHAMB ER WATCH (A ug. 30, 20 18), https://
www .chambero fco mmercewatch .org/j ud ge-ka vanaugh-bu siness-dec is ions/.
23 Id.
24
o . 17-7 J, sli p op. I (U .S. Nov. 27, 20 18).
25 .Id. at 15.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g. , Massachusetts v. U.S. En vtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 53 4-35
(2007) (forci ng th e EPA to take acti o n under the Clean A ir Act aga inst global
warmin g and c lim ate ch ange); Rapanos v. United States, 54 7 U.S. 7 15, 733-37
(2006) (emph as iz ing that regul ati on of wetl ands fall s under the Clean Water
Act); Babbitt v. Sweet H ome Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 5 15 U.S.
68 7, 703 -08 ( 1995) (uph olding the inclusion of "habitat harm" as definiti o n of
" take" under th e ESA).
28 See Carpenter Ind us. Co uncil v . Z inke, 854 F.3d I, 9 (D. C . Cir. 20 17); Otay
Mesa Prop., L.P. v. U. S. D ep' t o fthe Interi o r, 646 F.3 d 9 14, 91 8- 19 ( D. C . Cir.
20 I I); A m. Bird Conservancy v. Fed. Comm . Comm ' n, 5 16 F .3d 1027, I 03 537 ( D.C . Cir. 2008).
29 Am. B ird Conser vancy, Inc., 5 16 F.3d at I 035-37 .
30 Id. at J 03 1 n. I (ex plaining th at Justice Kavanaugh was incorrect in asserting th at the petiti o ner's case was not ripe because th e FCC was not, in fact,
reconsidering it s order rega rding mi gratory birds and communi cati on towers in
th e G ulf Coast regio n).
31 854 F .3d at I .
32 Id. at 5 ("A do ll ar of economic harm is still an inju ry-in-fact fo r standing
purposes.").
33 Id.
34 646 F.3 d 9 14 ( D.C. C ir. 20 11 ).
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35 I d. at 9 18 (findin g that, absent furth er expl anati on, a SLLrvey of th e pl ainti ffs ' property which fo und an endangered spec ies in one location was not
enough to demonstrate that th e pl ainti ffs ' property was occupi ed by that spec ies
fo r the purposes of th e ESA).
36 829 F. 3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 201 6).
37 Id. at 73 2 ( Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphas is in original) (contendin g
that the " E PA considered the benefits to animals of revoking the permit, but
[th e] EPA never considered the costs to humans").
38 Order No. 15-1 363 (D.C. Cir. 201 8) (concerning the Clean Power Plan).
39 Id.
40 472 F. 3d 872 (D. C. Ci r. 2006).
41 Id. at 879-82 (Kavanaugh, J., co ncurrin g).
42 Justice Kavanaugh's 96-4 "again st wildlife" total score is notabl e beca use
other judges on the D. C. Circuit scored much better than Ju stice Kavanaugh ' s.
Judge Dav id Sentell e, fo r example, undoubtedl y a conservati ve jurist, appointed
by Pres ident Reagan to fill Justi ce Scali a 's seat on the D .C. Circuit, possesses
a 57-43 "aga in st wildlife" score. Judge Merri ck Ga rl and , Pres ident Obama' s
pi ck to repl ace Justice Sca li a on th e Supreme Court, but who never received a
vote by the maj ority Senate Republi cans, possesses a 46-54 "again st wildlife"
score, meaning he votes with wildlife fifty-four percent of th e tim e. See infra
Appendi x A and B.
43 Fund fo r Animals v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 873 (D. C. Cir. 2006)
(holding that " [t]he amended Migratory Bird T reaty Act does not ban the hunting or killing of non-nati ve mi gratory bird spec ies, in cluding mute swans").
44 Id. at 873, 879.
45 See generally Convention fo r the Protecti on of Migratory Birds, U.S. Great Bri ta in, Aug. 16, 19 16, 39 Stat. 1702; Conventi on Between the United
States of A meri ca and the Uni ted Mex ica n States fo r the Protecti on o f Mi gratory Birds, Etc., February 7, 1963 , 50 Stat. 131 1; The Convention Between th e
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for
th e Protection of Migratory Birds in Danger of Ex tinction, and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329; Co nventi on Between the United States of
Ameri ca and the Uni on of Sov iet Sociali st Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Th eir Environment, Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S .T. 4647.
46 Fund for Animals Inc., 4 72 F.3d at 88 1-82.
47 See, e.g., 19 11 Treaty fo r the Preservati on and Protecti on of Fur Seals, Jul y
7, 19 11 , 37 Stat. 154; 1942 Western Hemi sph ere Conventi on on Nature Protecti on and Wildli fe Preservati on, May I, 1942, 56 Stat. 1374; 161 U.N. T.S 193 ;
1975 Conventi on on Intern ati onal Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora; Mar. 3, 1973, 12 l. L.M I 085 ; 1976 Agreement on Conservati on of
Polar Bea rs, Nov. 15, 1973, 13 l.L.M 13.
48 Despite vo lumin ous U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding the lawmaking force of treati es pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. 11 , § 2, Justice Kavanaugh's unnecessary "extra" concurrence also oddl y laments treat ies ' ability "to
eliminate the Ho use of Representati ves from th e law-m akin g process ." Fund
for Animals , 472 F.3d at 88 1 ( Kava naugh, J., concurrin g); see also Darren
Sam uelsohn, Ka vanaugh 's Words on Presidenlial Probes Come Back to Haunt
H im , PouT1co (Jul y I 0, 20 18), https://www. po liti co.co m/ story/20 18/07/1 0/
brett-kavanaugh-pres identi al-in vesti gati ons-708705.
49 Fund fo r A nimals, 472 F. 3d at 875-76.
50 i d. at 873 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2 01 2)).
51 Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of2004, 16 .S.C. § 703 (a){ l) (20 12).
52 Fund for Animals, 472 F.3 d at 876- 77 .
53 Id. at 873, 879.
54 Ocea na, Inc. v. Guti errez, 488 F. 3d 1020, 102 1, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
55 I d. at I 02 1-22, I 025-26.
56 Id. at I 025-26.
57 See id. at I 02 1-22, I 025-26.
58 See Am. Bird Conservancy v. Fed. Comm. Co mm ' n, 5 16 F.3d I 02 7, I 03 435 (D.C. C ir. 2008).
59 Id. at I 035.
60 i d. at I 03 I.
61 Id.
62 North Caro lina Fisheries Ass ' n v. Guti errez, 550 F.3 d 16, 17 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
63 Id. at 19.
64 Id. at 2 1.
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E. iagara Pub. Power All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n , 558 F.3d
564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

66
67
68
69

°

Id.
Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(2)(D) (20 12).
£ . Niagara Pub. Power All., 558 F.3d at 567.
Id. at 567-68.

7

For full disclosure, the author represented and argued for the DefendantIntervenor, whi ch was on the losi ng side of the case.
71
Otay Mesa Prop. v. U.S. Dep' t of Interi or, 646 F.3d 9 14, 9 16-1 9 (D.C . C ir.
2011) [hereinafler Oray Mesa If] .
72 Otay Mesa Prop. v. U.S. Dep ' t of Interior, 7 14 F. Supp. 2d 73 , 83 (D.D.C.
20 I 0) [hereinafler Oray Mesa J] .
73
Oray Mesa II, 646 F .3 d at 9 16-1 7.
74
Id. at 9 18- 19.
75
i d. at 9 19.
76 S ierra C lub v. Van Antwerp, 66 1 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (D.C. Ci r. 20 12)
[hereinafler Sierra Club If] .
77
Id.; see also Sierra C lu b v. Van Antwerp, 7 19 F. Supp. 2d 58, 76 (D.D.C.
20 I 0) [hereinafler Sierra Club!].
78
Sierra Club I, 7 19 F. Supp. 2d at 6 1.
79 Sierra Club II, 66 1 F.3d at I 156.
80
Id. at 1157.
8 1 See 16 U.S .C. § I 538(a)(2) (20 12); see also Sierra Club II, 66 1 F.3d at
11 56.
82
Just ice Kavanaugh did not order ESA Section 7 consultation in this case
despite the clear federal sc ientifi c evidence that the snake would be harmed.
On other environmental cases where it has been alleged Ju stice Kavanaugh was
" pro-environment," these very small handful of decisions are eas ily explainable
on other gro unds. See, e.g. , Nat' l Mining Assoc. v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243
(D.C. Cir. 20 14) (ho lding that the Clean Water Act did not prohibit interagency
coordinat ion and that an EPA guidance on state-issued water pollution permits
was not subj ect to judicia l review); Nat. Res. Def. Co unci l v. U.S. Envtl. P rot.
Agency, 749 F. 3d 1055 ( D. C. Cir. 20 14) (deny ing the Natural Resources
Defense Co unc il 's petition on cement pollution except w ith regard to clearly
suspect the EPA affirmati ve defense policy in the Agency ru le); Am. Truckin g
Ass' ns v. Envt. Prot. Agency, 600 F.3d 624 (D.C. C ir. 20 I 0) (upho lding stricter
Ca lifornia motor vehicl e standards). Assu min g these flim sy "defenses of the
env ironment" represent " two total wins," even a broken c lock is co rrect twice
per day.
83
Friends of Blackwater v. Sa lazar, 69 1 F.3d 428, 439-40 (D.C. C ir. 20 12).
4
Id. at 438 (arguin g the impracticability of the Secretary adopt ing criteria
that "by their nature could never be met and hence would precl ude delisting a
spec ies so long as those criteria remain in effect").
85
Id. at 440.
86
16 U.S.C. § 1535(1) (20 12) (stat ing that state laws may be m ore, but not
less, restricti ve th an the regulations in the ESA) .
87
Conservation Force v. Jewell , 733 F.3d 1200, 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
88 Id. at 1207.
89
Id. at 1203-05.
90 Center for Biolog ica l Diversity v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 749 F.3d I 079,
1080 (D.C. C ir. 20 14); see generally C lean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 7409(b)(2)
(describing national secondary ambient air quality sta ndards which specify "a
leve l of air qua lity the atta inment and maintenance of whi ch ... is requisite
to protect the public we!fare from an y known or anti cipated adverse effects
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air").
91
See generally Cenrer for Biological Diversity,749 F.3d at I 080-82.
92
Id. at I 085 (quoting th e Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. I 021 8, 20,236 (Apr. 3,
20 12), to explai n that direct exposu re is not the only way in whic h chemica ls
can ca use harm).
93
Id. at I 089 (quoting the rule and ex plaining that the EPA "determined that a
rev ision was not 'appropriate ' when sc ientific uncertainty dep rived the Agency
of a ' reasoned way to choose ' an appropriate standard").
94
Id. at 1090 n.1 8.
95
Id. at 903.
96 Id. at 90 I .
97
id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)( I) (20 12) (stat in g that determinations are
conc lu sion s that a spec ies is or is not endangered or threatened); 16 U.S.C. §
1533 (b)(3)-(4) (20 12) (o utlining the statu tory time frame s by which FWS or
NMFS must respond to petition s to li st or deli st)
98
Friends of Animals v. Ashe, 808 F.3d 900, 90 1 ( D. C. Cir. 20 15).
99 i d. at 903.
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too Id. at 900 -0 I.
Id. at 904-05 .
102
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B) (20 12) .
103 Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewe ll , 8 15 F.3d I , 3, 5 ( D .C. C ir. 20 16).
104
Id. at 3, 7, 8.
105
i d. at 7.
IOI

t06
107

Id.
Id. at 3, 6-7.

108 Ark Initiati ve v. Tidwell , 8 16 F.3d I 19, 12 1, 122 (D.C . C ir. 201 6); see 36
C.F.R. § 294.41 (definin g road less area characteristics as " ( I) hi gh qua li ty or
undisturbed soi l, water, and air; (2) sources of publi c drinkin g water; (3) dive rsity o f plant and anima l communities; (4) Habitat for threa tened, endangered ,
proposed, candidate, and sensi ti ve species, and for th ose spec ies dependent o n
large, undi stu rbed areas of land ; (5) primitive, semi-primitive non motori zed
and semi-primiti ve motorized c lasses of di spersed recreation ; (6) reference
landscapes; (7) natural-appea rin g landsca pes w ith high scenic qua lity; (8)
trad iti ona l cultural properties a nd sacred s ites; and (9) other loca ll y ide ntified
unique characteristics").
!09 See Ark Initiative, 816 F.3d at 122, 128.
110
id. at 122.
111 See Friends of Animal s v . Salazar, 626 F. S upp . 2d I 02, I 05-06 (D.D.C .
2009).
112
See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(A).
11 3 See Salazar, 626 F. Supp . 2d at I 07 (stati ng the cause of action and discussi ng the import take permit exemption to the ESA th at al lows for the trade
of hunted trophies of an endange red capti ve-bred anima l).
114 See Friends of Anima ls v. Jewe ll , 824 F.3d I 033, I 036-37 (D.C. C ir. 20 16).
115
Id. at I 037 .
116 See Earthreports, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm ' n, 828 F.3d 949,
952 ( D.C. Cir. 20 16).
117
Id. at 952 .
11 8
Id. at 959.
119

See generally id.

120

Mingo Logan Coa l Co. v. U.S. Envt l. Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 7 10, 730-41
(D .C. C ir. 20 16) (Kavana ugh, J., dissent ing).
121 Id. at 7 17, 73 0; see also C lean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 1- 1388. The
C lean Water Act's wet lands provisions, under Section 404 of the Act, have
proven to be a li ghtning rod fo r conservative lega l activists, including Ju stice
Kavanaugh, over th e years.
122 See generally Mingo Logan Coal Co., 829 F.3d at 732 , 737-38 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (construing a cost-benefit ana lys is to the EPA ' s permit
decision making under Section 404 of the C lean Water Act).
123
124
125
126

See id.
Id. at 722, 723-24 n .7.
See id.
Carpenters Indus. Counc il v. Z inke, 854 F.3 d I, 2 (D .C . C ir. 20 17).

i d.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 i d.
13 1
Id. at 2-3.
132
i d. at 9.
133 See generally C lean Ai r Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 740 I- 767 1 (20 12).
134 Coral Davenport, Appeals Court Hears Challenges ro Obama 's Climate Change Rule, .Y. TI MES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www .nytimes.
com/20 16/09/28/us/po I itics/a ppeal s-court-h ears-c ha 1lenge-to-obamas-c l imatechan ge-ru les. htrn I.
135 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
127

136
137
138

549 U.S. 497 (2007).

See id. at 534 .
See, e.g., Emi ly ' s List v. Fed. Election Comm ' n, 581 F.3d I , 4 (D.C . Cir.

2009) ("The First Am endment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, protects
the ri ght of indi vidual c itizens to spend unlimited a mo unts to ex press the ir
views about poli cy issues and candidates fo r pub lic office.").
! 39 See, e.g., 42 U.S .C. § 752 1(a)( l )-(3) (20 12) (ob ligatin g the Agency ' s to
make endangerment findings in specific c ircumstances).
140 See generally Donald J. Wuebbles, Dav id W . Fahey, & Kathy A. Hibbard,
Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, U.S.
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM (20 17) (ana lyzing how humancaused c limate pollution has led to a numbe r of negati ve impacts inc ludin g
wi ldl ife and habitat declines).
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141 See generally Robert W e issman , An analysis ofJustice Ka vanaugh 's Opinions in Split-Decision Cases, Pusuc CmzEN (2018) (finding an "overwhelming

143 See, e.g., Igor Bo bic, Democratic Senator says Brett Kavanaugh
confirmation process is "Not No rmal, " H LJFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 2, 201 8),

tendency to reach conclusion s favorable to bu siness interests and opposed to
cons ume rs, w o rkers, e nviro nmenta l protecti o ns, and v ictim s of human ri g hts
a buses" ).
142 The .S . Constitution pl aces no upper o r lo we r limit o n the number of
S upre m e Co urt justices . The number does no t need to be nine. In the sho rt
term , the Senate should not be " rushed" in confirmin g an ideologica l jurist
who would tip the balance of the Court, particul a rly with mid-term elections
co min g up, as well as the on go in g criminal investi gation of the President
and hi s a ides . See, e.g., B o bby Cervantes, Ted Cruz Says 'Long Historical
Precedenl 'fo r Smaller Supreme Court, POLITIFACT (No v. 23 , 201 6), https://
w w w . po Iiti fa ct.co m/texa s/staternen ts/2016/ nov /23/ted-cruz/ted-cruz-says-lo ngh istorical-preceden t-smaller-su/ (explaining that throughout the hi story of th e
Supreme C ourt, there have been large gaps of time with only eight justices,
several times lasting over o ne year) ; ick Fahey, The Supreme Court Can Deal
wilh Eig hl Justices, C B C ( Mar. 3, 201 6), https://www .cnbc.co m/ 20 16/03/03/
the-supreme -co urt-can-dea l-w ith-eight-justices. html (no ting th at nearl y twenty
pe rce nt o f a ll Supreme Co urt opini o ns sin ce 1946 have been ti e votes) .

https ://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brett-kavanaugh-documents_
us_ 5b8c0a28e4b0ct7b003 73cf9; Jo hn Bo wden , Feinstein 'Alarmed ' Na tional
Archives is Withholding Kavanaug h Documents, T HE HI LL (Aug. 8, 201 8),
http ://thehill .com/ ho menews/senate/400860-feinste in -a larmed-nati o na larc hi ves-is-withho lding-kavanaug h-documentshttp://thehill .com/ho me news/
senate/400860- fei nstein-a !armed-natio nal-arch ives-i s-withholding-ka vanaug hdocumen ts; Shery l Stolberg, While House Withholds 100,000 pages of Judge
Brett Kavanaug h 's Records, N .Y. T1MES (Sept. I, 201 8) , https://www .nytim es.
com/201 8/09/0 I / us/politics/ kavan aug h-records .html ).
144 Jordain Carn ey, Republicans Confirming Trump's Court Nom inees
at Record Pace, T HE HI LL (M ay I, 201 8), https://thehill.com/ homenews/
senate/385 72 8-repu bl icans-con firmin g-trumps-court-no min ees-at-record-pace .
145 Cf " And I broug ht you into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit the reo f and
the goodness thereo f: but when ye entered, ye defil ed my land, and made min e
heri tage an abo min ati o n." Jeremiah 2 :7 ( King James).
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continued f rom page 2 1
See id. (adding that a n e mpl oyee o f the s ublessee later burn ed th e site to the
ground, ca us in g furth er PCE conta minati o n).
9
See N ex t Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adche m Corp., 201 7 WL 43 50729,
at * LO (201 7) (e xplaining that Next Millennium vo luntarily conducted a
c leanup o f the s ite upo n purchase in 1987-98 a nd sought cost recovery and
contributi o n unde r CE RC LA Secti o ns I 07, I 13(f)(3)( B), and (g)(2)).
10 See Brief fo r Defe nda nts-Appe llees at 5, ex t Mille nn ium Rea lty, LLC v.
A d che m Corp. , 2 01 6 WL 5699964 (2d C ir. 20 16) (No. 16- 1260-cv) (a rg uing
that strict liability is justifi ed due to N SR 's bene fit fro m the activiti es th at
ca used th e co nta min ation) .
11 2 15 F.3 d 32 1 (2d C ir. 2000).
12 See Next Millennium, 690 F. A pp ' x at 7 14 (deny ing th e pl a inti ff's request
to overrul e Commander Oil d ue to case law that says the court is bound by pri or
dec is io ns unl ess overrul ed by an e n ba ne pa ne l o r by the Supre me Co urt).
13 See genera lly Commander Oil Corp. , 2 15 F. 3d at 32 1 (dive rg in g fro m the
sta te-specific co mmon la w definition o f "owner" under CE RC LA).
14 See id. a t 330-3 1 (ex pla ining th at the fi ve fa cto rs are no n-exclusive).
15 See ex t Mill ennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adche m Corp., o. CV
03-5985(A R_L), 20 14 WL 54254 88, a t * 11 (E. D. .Y . O ct. 22 , 2014), ajf'd sub
nom . ex t Mill e nnium Rea lty, LLC v. A dc he m Corp. , 690 F. A pp' x 7 10, 7 15
(2d C ir. 201 7) (concluding that the landowne r had th e ben e fits and respo ns ibiliti es o f o wners hip).
16 See id. ( re fu s ing to ho ld the di sso lved co rpo ratio n respon s ibl e despite the
tenant acting a a n owner by subl eas ing to an o pe rato r wh o ca used th e co nta minati o n of the s ite) .
17 See generally Commander Oil Corp., 2 15 F.3 d at 327 (emph asizing the
di stin cti o ns be tween "owne r" and " o pe rator" a nd ass ig ning liability based o n
the unique fa cts o f the case).
18 See Petiti o n for Writ o f Certio ra ri , sup ra no te I, at i (di stin g ui shin g the
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20 See generally , Next Mill ennium Rea lty, LLC v . A dchem Corp. , No. C V
03-59 8 5(GR-8), 2016 WL 11 7895 7 ( E.D . . Y. M ar. 2 3, 2016).
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24 See infra Pa rt Ill (demonstrating that co urts th at follow state common law
definition of "owners hip" pl ace the financial burden o f cleanup on those re spons ible fo r th e conta minati o n).
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re lease . .. ." H. R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 307 1(a)( l )(C) ( 198 0), reprinted in 2 A
Leg islative Hi sto ry of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 1980, at 39 ( 1983). However, thi s causati o n lan guage
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53 See United States v. C hem-Dy ne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 , 807, 8 10 (S. D.
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(c itin g 126 Cong . Rec. 30,932 ( 1980)) (enco uraging courts lo use state co mmon law to determin e when joint tortfeasors become lia bl e und er CERCLA to
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58 See 42 U.S.C. § 96 I 3(f)( l )(20 12) (c larifying CE RC LA with SARA that
there is contribution); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 11 92, 1198 (2d
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64
See 42 U.S.C. § 96 13(f) (20 12); see, e.g., Un ited States v. Twp. of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 3 18- 3 19 (6th C ir. 1998) ( usin g a li st of factors lo detem1in e
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C ir. 2000) (abando nin g New York comm o n law principles).
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86
fd. at 56 (noting that a circu lar definition requires court interpretation).
87
See Commander Oil, 2 t 5 F.3d at 328 (decid ing to treat "owner" as separate
from "operator").
88
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra note l , at l 0 (noting that the Commander Oil test enco urages liti gati on).
89 See City of Los Ange les v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 447 (9th
Cir. 20 l I) (encouraging imposition of cleanup costs on those who are respons ibl e for contaminati o n) .
90
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WL 5479484 (20 t 7) (a rg uing that leases usually have greater property interest
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.S. 5 I , 64 (I 998) (explaining that
circuits disagree over whether to rely on state common law or federa l common
law for veil piercing). Compare Long Beach Unified Sch . Dist. v. Dorothy B.
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(2d Cir. 2000) (reason ing that the circular definition of "owner" within the statute "does not automaticall y assign liability to every party that has a connection
to the contaminated facility").
118
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the sublease, th ere sho uld be a path of li ab ility to hold the sublesso r liab le for
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li ability).
130 See Petition for Writ of Certiorar i supra note I, at 8-9 (a rguing that the
S upreme Court should overrule Commander Oil because it does not fo ll ow the
remedial purposes of the stan1te ).
131 See, e.g., Ri vera v. Ne l on Rea lty, LLC, 858N.E.2d 11 27 , I 129(N.Y.
2006) (noting that statute or contract may ass ign liability to a landl ord fo r to rt
on the property, but thi s is not th e presumption).
132 See Commander Oil, 2 15 F.3d at 329 (releasing a tenant from ownership
liability despite hav in g attributes o f ownership, thereby all owin g a PRP to
escape liability when Congress intended that PRP to be held lia bl e fo r cleanup
costs).
133 See id. (expanding upon the si te contro l test, which follows the state common law definition of "ownership" a long w ith occupati on ofa property, wh ich
creates a higher standard for PRPs to meet).
134 See id. at 328 (reasoning that the defi niti on of " operato r" ass ig ned by th e
Supreme Court in Bestfoods should not overlap wi th the definition of"owner").
135 See id. at 328-29 (fi nding that s ite contro l alone is an impro per basis for the
impositi on on sublessees of owner li ab ility).
136 See id. at 327 (notin g that Congress gave "owner" a c ircul a r definiti on
under CERC LA).
137 See id. at 329 (acknowl edg ing th at lessees are often li abl e as operators, but
not usua lly as owners under CE RCLA).
138 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 5 1, 52 ( 1998) (notin g that common law principles are the presumpti on fo r interpretin g a statute that does not
directly in struct otherwise); Peti ti on fo r Writ of Certiorari, supra note I, at 8
(emphas izing that property law is a matter of state law, not federa l law).
139 Cf Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 65 (findin g that PRPs may be li ab le as operato rs
where they are not li ab le as owners).
140 See Co lorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (D. Colo. 1985)
(supporti ng the development of th e federa l common law to ach ieve uniformity
of the law).
141 See United States v. Md. Bank & Tr. Co., 632 F. Supp . 573, 577 (0. Md.
1986) (explainin g that a party may be he ld li able as " th e owner and operator,"
and also may be held li ab le as e ith er the "owner" or th e "opera tor").
142 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Rea lty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d C ir.
1985) (holding the defendant li ab le as both owner and operator).
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)( I )-(2) (stating "the owner and operator of a vesse l
or a faci lity" and "any person who ... owned or operated"); see, e.g., Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at I 052 (suggestin g that an "owner" may or may not
a lso be the "operator" of a property).
144 See Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 578 (fi nding that operator and owner
can be he ld liabl e separate ly but acknowledging from th e grammar of statute
that a party can be held liable as both).
145 See id. (ex pl ainin g that due to Congress ' s haste in writing th e statute, co urts
need not interpret th e statute as exact).
146 See generally Co lorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp . 1484 , 1486 ( 0.
Co lo . 1985) (noting th at federa l courts may use their di screti on to interpret the
statute within the intentions of the Congress).
147 See id. (conc luding that Congress e mpowered federal courts to decide
whether to permit contribution among responsible parties).
148 See general(y Petiti on fo r Writ of Certi orari , supra note I (co mparing the
Second Circuit ownership test to the N inth C ircuit approach to CE RCLA ownership liability and arguing that th e Second C ircuit ownership test is incorrect).
149 See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Un ited States, No. CV- 14-08165- PCT-OGC,
20 17 WL 2405266, at *4 (0. Ari z. June 2, 20 17) (rely in g on Ca li fo rn ia case
law to determin e that a fee tit le owner has control over how a ho lde r of a permit
uses the property).
15 Compare id. at *7 (c iting Castl erock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham ,
87 1 F. Supp. 360, 364 (N. D. Ca l. 1994)) (questi oning " indicia of ow nership,"
whi ch may no longer be good law in Ca li fo rnia, in determining owner liabili ty
under CE RCLA, and noting th at even San Pedro di scussed the unique facts
of the case to support its finding), with Comm ander Oil Corp. v. Bario Equ ip .
Corp ., 2 15 F.3d 32 1, 330-33 1 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying th e unique facts of th e
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case to a factor test to de termine liability, and expandin g th e common law site
control test).
151 See C ity of Los Ange les v. San Pedro Boat Works , 635 F.3d 440, 449 (9th
C ir. 20 I I) (rejecting both the Commander Oil test and the "s ite control" test) .
152 See, e.g., Long Beach Unifi ed Sch. Di st. v. Doroth y B. Godw in Ca l. Living
Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th C ir. 1994) (ana lyzi ng mostly Ca li forn ia common
law); San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d at 448 (looking to co mmon law to
di stingui sh between ownership interests and possessory interests); El Paso Na t.
Gas Co., 20 17 WL 2405 266, at *5 (foll ow ing the exampl e of common law to
look to th e law govern ing the property rather th an to th e unique facts of the
case).
153 Compare El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 2017 WL 24 05266, at *5 (questioning
whether fee title is suffic ient to define owne rship fo r liability under CER C LA)
with Commander Oil, 2 15 F.3d at 330 (deciding that site control a lone is insu ffici ent for defi ning ow nership under CERCLA).
154 See, e.g., San Pedro Boal Works, 635 F.3d at 449 (loo kin g to state common
law to determine that mere ly ho lding possessory interests does not constitute a n
owner under CE RCLA); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 F.3d at 1368 (looking to state com mon law to determine that holding an easement does not itse lf
constitute "owners hip" ho lding).
155 See Long Beach Unified Sch. Dis1., 32 F.3 d at 1368 (notin g that Co ngress
purpose full y wrote a c ircul ar definiti on fo r "owner" in CE RCLA).
156 See id. at 1370 (affirming the di strict court's decision to grant the defendant 's motion to di smiss, because merely hav in g an easement does not constitute "ownership").
157 See id.
158 Id. at 1368 (recogni z ing the di stinctions between property interest and
ri ghts of exc lusion, and between owning an ease ment and ow ning the property
itse lf).
159 See generally San Pedro Boat Works , 635 F.3d at 443 (ho lding that because
Pacific Ameri can was a ho lder of mere possessory interests, BCI Coca-Cola
was not a n owner and therefore not he ld li ab le as an owner).
160 See id. (ho lding that Pac ific American was not li ab le as a n owner for contributi on to costs of c leanup).
161 See Petiti on for Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 8 (ca ll ing upon the
S upreme Court to overturn the Second Ci rc uit 's ownership test).
162 See id. at 9 (ex plaining that under New York common law, courts generally ho ld tenants and not landl ords respons ibl e for injury ca used by the leased
property) .
163 See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, No. C V- 14-08 165- PCT-DGC,
20 17 WL 3492993, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 20 17) (emphas iz ing the rele vance
of federa l statutory and common law in addition to the ordinary meaning of
property ownership in deciding to ho ld the party li ab le that was respons ibl e for
the contam ination).
164 See id. at *3. (notin g that no authority limits ownership to one entity).
165 See id. at *5. (expl a inin g that a lthough the Navajo Nati on had a significant
property interest in the land, the defendan ts were held li ab le as owners w hen
consi deri ng the remedial purpose of the statute and the defend ants ' supervi sory
and plenary powers in the land).
166 See, e.g., C ity of Los Ange les v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 44 7
(9th C ir. 20 I I) (re li evi ng a party who did not know or have reason to know of
the contamination); Long Beach Unified Sch . Di st. v. Doroth y B. Godwin Ca l.
Li ving Tr., 32 F.3 d 1364 , 1366 (9th C ir. 1994) (avo iding pl ac ing the burden on
those who mere ly have an easement fo r the faci lity and are no t responsible for
the po llution); El Paso Na t. Gas Co., 2017 WL 2405266, at* I, *5 (D. Ari z.
June 2, 20 17).
167 See Petition fo r Writ of Certi orari, supra note I, at I I (notin g that Co ngress
intended to encourage parties to share the costs of cleanup).
l68 6 13 F. 3d 9 10 (9th C ir. 20 10).
169 See id. at 9 16 (ca lcul ating the statute of limitations from the time a party
incurs cleanup costs).
170 See id. at 9 15 (noting that lawsuits would be delayed if ownership wa s
calculated at the time a lawsuit was fi led).
171 See Next Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp ., No . CV
03-5985(GRB), 20 16 WL 11 78957 (E.D.N.Y . Mar. 23, 20 16), aff'd sub
nom. Nex t Mi llennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp ., 690 F. App'x 7 10 (2d
C ir. 20 17), cerl. denied, 138 S. Ct. 5 10(20 17) (ho lding the subseq uent buyer
liable as th e owner and not a llowing the subseq uent buyer to rece ive contribution from th e oth er PRPs).
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172
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note I, at I 0 (noting that Congress
inte nded that PRPs share the costs of cleanup and therefore th e subseque nt
bu yer co uld have sought contribution from th e PRPs).
173
Next Millennium, 690 F. App ' x a t 7 14 (explainin g th e pl a intifr s a rgument
th at te na nts who sublease a site with o ut noti ce or consent to the owner and
benefit fro m the sublease should be held liable for th e clea nup of conta minants
tha t occ ur as a result o f the sublease).
174
See id. (e mphas izing that the subsequent purchaser was understandabl y
confident that the other PRPs wou ld be held liabl e).
175
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra no te I, at 7 (de monstratin g th e
roo m for ma nipul ati on in Second C ircuit liti gation o f CE RC LA liability, whi ch
makes th e Commander Oil factor test invalid and incon sistent with Cong ress's
inte nt).
176
See OHM Re mediation Servs. v . Evans Cooperage Co., 11 6 F.3d I 574,
I 578 (5th C ir. I 997) (speci fy ing that all sued parties are " potenti all y li abl e").
177 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F .2d I 192, I I 98 (2d Cir. I 992)
(ex press ing that th e Supre me Court has held tJrnt co urts should fo ll ow th e pl ai n
la ng uage o f the statute) ; 35 50 Steven s Cree k Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 9 15
F.2d 135 5, 1363 (9th C ir. 1990) (enforcing broad inte rpretation s th at th e statute
a lso pe rmits o n its face) .
178 See Pe tition for Writ o f Certiorari, supra note I, at 8 (expl ainin g th at under
New York comm on Jaw, li ability in to rt con cernin g property generall y depends
o n occ upa ti o n and control , and New York 's courts foll o wed thi s principl e to
interpret sta te environm ental statutes). But see Dept. o f Toxic Substances
Contro l v. Hearth side Res identi al Co rp ., 61 3 F. 3d 910, 9 14 (9 th Cir. 20 I 0)
(ex plainin g th at the statute of limita ti ons is ca lc ul ated fro m the tim e cl ea nup
costs are in c urred).
179
See, e.g., N e w Yo rk v. Shore R ea lty Corp., 759 F. 2d I 03 2, 1050 (2d C ir.
198 5) ( findin g th e defenda nt suffici e ntl y li a bl e as bo th owne r a nd ope rato r of
the facility).
180 See United States v. Md . Bank & Tr. Co., 63 2 F. Supp . 573, 577 ( D. Md.
1986) (ex pl a ining th at a party may be held li abl e as " th e owne r and operator,"
th e "owne r," o r th e "operator").
18 1
See id. a t 578 (ass igning operato r and o wne r li ability separately a nd
ex pl a inin g th e impe rfect nature of the statute's gra mmar).
182 See Pe titi o n fo r Writ o f Certi orari , supra note I, a t i (arg uing that te na nts
who sublea e a site w itho ut noti ce o r consent to th e owner a nd benefit fro m the
sublease sho uld be he ld li ab le fo r the cleanu p of conta minants that occur as a
result of tJ1 e subl ease).
183
See C ity o f Los Ange les v. San Pedro B oat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 444-45
(9th C ir. 20 I I) (recognizi ng th at the PRP di d not have th e power to convey the
revoca bl e pe rmit with out the landowner's a pp rova l a nd thus d id not pass th e
" bundl e of sti c ks" ru le).
184
See Pe titi o n fo r Writ of Certi o rari , supra note I, a t 8- 9 (relyin g o n sta te
co mmo n law fo r land and bu ildin gs, and spec ify ing that in ew York com mon
law, thi s rul e re ma in s the presumpti on unless ex press ly modifi ed by contract or
statute).
185
See id. (co nc ludin g th at beca use ew Y ork commo n law genera ll y depen ds
o n occupa ti o n a nd control , the subl essor of the fa cility, not th e landl ord, should
be he ld re po nsibl e) .
186
See 3550 Ste ve ns C ree k Assocs. v. Barcl ays Bank, 9 15 F.2d 1355, 1365
(9th C ir. 19 90) (findin g that CERC LA 's strict li ability cann ot be extended to
past a nd present owners o f buildin gs containin g asbestos).
7
l8
Compare ex t Millennium Real ty, LLC v. Adch e m Co rp., No . CV
03-5985(GRB), 20 16 WL I 178957 (E.D.N.Y . Mar. 23, 2016), ajj"d sub
nom. Next Mill e nnium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 690 F. App 'x 7 10 (2d
C ir. 20 I 7), cert. denied, ext Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 138
S . C t. 510(2017) (describing that the sublessor may have exerci sed site control
over th e prope rty, but still find ing that the sublessor wa s not liable for contributi o n beca use it was di ssolved) with 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 9 15 F. 2d at
1365 (n otin g th a t the PRP did not hold the " bund le o f ri ghts" that are required
und e r Ca lifornia common law to constitute own ership, a nd th erefore findin g th e
PRP no t li a bl e as an owner under CE RCLA).
188 See 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F. 2d at 1365 ( Pregerson, J., di ssenting) (no tin g that Section I 07(a)(2) applies to a narrow pri vate class o f la ndowne rs unde r CE RC LA).
189
See id. (recog ni z ing that a narrow interpretation of CERC LA liability
wo uld fru strate th e purpose of the statute, a nd in stead a ppl ying a narrow
inte rpre ta ti o n of owne r li a bility due to Jack o f re leva nt commo~ Jaw rega rding
asbestos di sposa l).
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190 See Co mm ander Oil Co rp. v. Bario Equip . Corp. , 2 15 F.3d 32 I, 327 (2d
C ir. 2000) (recogni zing the diffi culty in limiting CERCLA liability, yet lim itin g
liability to those who do not pass a fi ve-factor test).
19 1 See id. at 327- 28 (di stingui shing between Bestfoods and Commander
Oil). See generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 5 1, 52 ( I 998) (defi nin g "operator" as th e e ntity that manages, directs, or conducts contaminatin g
acti ons).
192 See City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 448 (9th
C ir. 20 I I) (specifying that an easement alone does not con stitute ownership and
that other elements a re required to be liabl e under C ERCLA) .
193 See id. at 445 (looking to common Jaw in the state where the land at issue is
located) .
194 See id. at 447 (ex pl aining that BC! Coca-Co la, as successor-i n-interest to
Pacific A meri can, would constitute an "owner" if Pacific A merican constitutes

an "own er").
195 See id. at 448-49 (considering case law where co urts looked at site contro l
to determin e ownership and ex press ly rejecting th e Commander Oil factor test
as nebul ous and flexibl e).
196 See id. at 449 (rejecting the Second Ci rcuit' s fa ctor test as susceptib le to
manipul ati on).
197 See Petiti on fo r Writ of Certi orari , supra note I, at 9 (ex plainin g th at New
York common Jaw presumes tenants and not landl ords are held responsibl e fo r
inju ry ca used by leased property).
198 See id. (stating that th e
inth C irc uit fo llows Congress's intent to hold
li abl e as owners those who retain ed the power of the property) .
199 See id. at 8-9 (ex pl aining that New York common Jaw has treated lessees as owners when th ey have control over the site at th e time of injury or
contaminati on) .
200 See generally id. (s ummarizing th at th e
ew York common law test for
ownership is wh ether the party had occ upation and site control).
201
See B.F. Goodric h Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d I 192, 11 98 (2d Cir. I 992);
3550 Stevens C reek Assoc iates v. Barclays Bank, 9 I 5 F.2d I 355, I 363 (9th Cir.
I 990) (en fo rcing broad interpretati ons that a re also pern1ined on the face of th e
statu te).
202 See Petiti on fo r Wri t of Certiorari , supra note I, at 6-7 (arguing that the
indi cia of ownership test is un predictable).
203 See 3550 Stevens Creek Associates, 9 I 5 F.2d at I 363 (interpretin g CE RC LA broadl y beca use it is a re medi al statute).
204 See El Paso
at. Gas Co. v. United States, o. CV- 14-08165- PCT- DGC,
20 I 7 WL 3492993, at *5 (D. Ar iz. Aug. 15, 201 7) (spec ify ing that the defendants gra nted th e avajo Na ti on exc lu sive use and occupancy of th e propen y,
and yet th e de fendants remained li able as owners).
205 See id. (fi nding that the defendants ' power over the la nd contributed to th eir
li ab ility as owners under CE RCLA).
206 See Ci ty o f Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 FJd 440, 449 (9th
Cir. 201 I) (defini ng the te rm "owner" by co mmon Jaw rath er than by a factor
test and crit ici zing the Commander Oil five - facto r test as easy to ma nipulate in
litigation due to fl exi ble fac tors).
207 Compare El Paso Na1. Gas Co., 20 I 7 WL 2405266, at *7 (citin g Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 87 1 F. Supp . 360, 364 (N. D. Cal.
I 994)) (questi oning th e ro le of" indi cia of ownership," whi ch may no longer
be good Jaw in Ca liforni a, in determining o wner li ability under CE RC LA, and
noting that even San Pedro di sc ussed the unique fa cts of the case to suppon
its fi ndin g), wilh Co mmander Oil Corp. v. Bario Equip . Corp., 2 I 5 F .3d 32 I,
330- 33 I (2d C ir. 2000) (a ppl yin g the unique facts of the case to a factor test to
determin e li abi lity, and ex panding th e common law site contro l test).
208 See El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 20 I 7 WL 2405266, at *7 (focusing o n the releva nt common law).
209 See Petitio n for Writ of Certi orari , supra note I, at 7 (n oting that the five
factors are easy to manipu late due to their nebulous nature).
2 10 See id. (noting that N ew York' s courts fo llowed the co mmon Jaw to interpret state environmental statutes).
211 See, e.g., El Paso Na!. Gas Co., 20 I 7 WL 3492993, at *5 (holdin g defen dants li a ble because they had significant power and contro l over th e property).
2 12 See Petiti on for Writ of Certi orari , supra note I, at 7 (explainin g th at New
York common Jaw generall y ho lds tenants and not landlords responsibl e for
injury caused by the leased prope rty).
213 See OHM Remediation Servs . v. Evan s Cooperage Co., I 16 F. 3d I 574,
1578 (5 th Cir. I 997) (di stributin g liability a mong those who were responsi bl e
fo r the contamin ati on, so that they bore the fin ancial burde n of the costs of
cleanup of the conta min ati on).
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214 See, e.g., 3550 Steven s Creek Assocs . v. Barclays Bank, 9 15 F.2d 135 5,
1363 (9th C ir. 1990) (recognizing th at despite broad interpretati on o f CER C LA
li ability, constructi on o f a statute cannot ex tend to what is not permitted on the
face o f the statute or to wh at is not supported by leg is lati ve hi story).
215 See Petiti on fo r Writ of Certi orari , supra note I, at 10 (arguing that Congress should create a c lear path fo r li abi lity of lessees where a tenant bas exc lus ive contro l ofa fac ility, subl eases with out th e landl ord 's consent or notice, and
pro fits substanti a ll y from subl eas in g th e fac ility).
216 See id. at 9- 10 (referencin g judici a l precedent th at promotes recovery from
res ponsible parties).
217 See id. at I 0 (emphas izing that a sub lessor who has exclus ive contro l over a
fac ili ty shoul d be an indicator of ownershi p).
218 See id. (ex pl aini ng that ext Mi ll ennium agreed to conduct the site remed iati on, wi th the confi dence that other liab le parti es wo uld con tribute to the
fi nan cial burden).
219 See id. (notin g that Congress ional intent is typica ll y fo ll owed by courts,
w ith the Second Circuit as the excepti on).
220 See id. (noting that th e Second C ircuit has not fo llowed congressional
intent). See generally City o f Los Ange les v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d
440, 449 (9th C ir. 20 I I) (rej ecting th e Commander Oil ownership test because
it does not cl early outlin e wh at an investor in a fac ility can ex pect).
221 See Fi scher, supra note 27 , at 1987 (ex pl a ining that government response
rather than pri vate clea nup de lays cleanup).
222 See id. at 1984 (ex pl aining that government response rathe r than priva te
cl eanup delays cleanup).
223 See ext M illennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 138 S. Ct. 510, 199
(20 I 7) (prov iding no ex planation as to why certi orari was deni ed).
224 See generally Petit ion for Writ of Certiora ri , supra note I (arguing that the
five-factor Commander Oil test does not a ll ow an in vestor in land to predi ct the
outco me of a contributi on suit).
225 See, e.g., id. (showing that Commander Oil is suscepti ble to manipulati on
in litigati on because the fac tors are unc lear, givin g courts too much di screti on
whi ch is like ly to res ult in a narrower interpretati on o f CE RCLA liability) .
226 See, e.g., id. at i (emph as iz ing th at the subsequent purchaser was understandabl y confident th at th e oth er PRPs would be he ld liabl e under CE RC LA
Section I I 3(f)).
227 See Fi scher, supra note 27, at 1987 (noti ng the im portance of pri vate
c leanup, and that the CE RCLA amendments confirm the importance of the
remed ial goa ls of the statute).
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228 See C ity of Los An geles v. Sa n Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 448-49
(9th C ir. 2011 ) (considering case law where co u1ts looked at s ite contro l to
de termine owne rship and express ly rejecting the Commander Oil factor test as
ne bul ous and fl ex ible).
229 See generally id. (expl aining that parti es o f a CE RC LA suit should be abl e
to ex pect a certain outco me, whi ch would in centi vize qui ck settl ements).
230 See 42 U. S.C. § 9601 (20)(a) (20 12) (definin g "owner or operator" as a
party that owns or operates); Petiti o n fo r Writ o f Certiorari , supra note I, at 8
(ca lling upon th e Supreme Court to overturn the Second C irc uit 's owne rship
test).
23 1 See Next M ill ennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp ., No. CV
03-5985(G RB), 20 16 W L 11 78957 (E. D. .Y. Mar. 23 , 20 16), aff'd sub
nom. Next M ill enniu m Realty, LLC v. Adche m Corp., 690 F. App ' x 7 10 (2d
C ir. 20 17), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 5 10 (20 17) (deny ing the pl a inti ff's req uest
to overrul e Commander Oil due to case law that says th e co urt is bound by prio r
dec is ions un less overrul ed by an e n bane pane l or by the S upre me Court).
232 Cf Ho ll y, supra note 34 at I 59-6 1 (emphas iz ing the need fo r uni fo rmity in
the appli cati on ofC ERC LA).
233 Cf id. (noting the di versity among state case law under CERC LA).
234 See generally Commander Oil Corp. v. Bari o Equip. Corp ., 21 5 F.3d
32 1 (se parating "owner" and "operator," the refore limiting liability to e ither
"owner" or "operator" li abili ty rath er than both).
235 T he Supreme Court must wa it to grant certi ora ri in a case a lternat ive to
Next Millennium, where the tenant corporati on has not been di ssolved. Cf Peti ti o n fo r Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, al 8 (arg uin g that th e S upreme Cou rt
sho ul d overrul e Commander Oil).
236 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d I I 92, I I 98 (2d C ir. I 992)
( prioriti z ing congressional intent when maki ng pivota l decis ions regard in g
CE RC LA interpretati on).
237 See Petiti on fo r Writ of Certi orari, supra note I, at i (asking the Sup re me
Co urt to change the sta ndard s for determi nin g owner li abi li ty under CE RCLA).
23 8 See, e.g., El Paso at. Gas Co. v. United States, o. CV-14-08 165 -PCTDGC, 201 7 WL 34 92993 , at * I (D. Ari z. Aug. 15, 201 7) (re ly in g on CE RC LA 's re medi a l purpose to support that the defendants were liabl e as own ers
under CE RCLA).
239 See, e.g., id. at * I (notin g th at th e inth C ircuit' s approach to owner li abil ity under CE RC LA a ll ows parties of a case to predi ct the outcome).
240 See Fischer, supra note 27, at 2003 (noting that CE RCLA attempts to
re move hazards of con tami nation q ui ck ly a nd efficient ly).
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